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444 abstract
The aim of this paper is to quantify institutional (political and fiscal) and non-
institutional uncertainty (economic policy uncertainty, Economists’ recession 
index, natural disasters-related uncertainty, and several disagreement measures). 
The stated indicators are based on articles from highly popular Croatian news 
portals, the repository of law amendments (Narodne novine), and Business and 
Consumer Surveys. We also introduce a composite uncertainty indicator, obtained 
by the principal components method. The analysis of a structural VAR model of 
the Croatian economy (both with fixed and time-varying parameters) has showed 
that a vast part of the analysed indicators are significant predictors of economic 
activity. It is demonstrated that their impact on industrial production is the strong-
est in the onset of a crisis. On the other hand, the influence of fiscal uncertainty 
exhibits just the opposite tendencies. It strengthens with the intensification of eco-
nomic activity, which partially exculpates the possible utilization of fiscal expan-
sion as a counter-crisis tool. 
Keywords: economic uncertainty, Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, VAR model 
with time-varying parameters
“The only relevant thing is uncertainty – the extent of our own knowledge and 
ignorance. The actual fact of whether or not the events considered are in some 
sense determined, or known by other people, and so on, is of no consequence.”
De Finetti, 1975:vi
1 IntRoDUctIon
The collapse of Lehman Brothers and the downturn of the US economy in 2008 
triggered a domino effect of spillovers on almost all of the world’s national econo-
mies. The crisis affected some countries only marginally (e.g. Poland and Slova-
kia), and some European countries recovered from the global shock in relatively 
short periods (Germany, Austria, Benelux countries), while the crisis in Croatia 
proved to be extremely resilient and long lasting. Two years passed from the 
evident onset of the crisis in Q3 2008 (Krznar, 2011) to the first transition of GDP 
growth to the positive domain. However, the positive shift was only short-lived. A 
double dip recession became evident in Q4 2011, followed by as many as 12 con-
secutive quarters of declining economic activity. This negative streak was one of 
the longest recessions in the whole of Europe (Buturac, 2017:23) and has trig-
gered an entire series of domestic studies.
Croatian economic practitioners and academics mostly agree that the crisis was 
the multi-layered consequence of numerous factors. Many authors (from several 
scientific disciplines) have referred to the demographic issues, the meta-determi-
nants of weak competitiveness such as the egalitarian syndrome (Burić and 
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445ever, the international literature also offers relevant evidence on the considerable 
influence of uncertainty on the decreased economic activity during the recent 
crisis (Bloom, 2009; Bachmann, Elstner and Sims, 2013; Baker, Bloom and Davis, 
2016, etc.). These studies are (with rare exceptions such as Arčabić, 2015) not 
followed by corresponding analysis for the Croatian economy. Therefore, a ques-
tion is raised: to what extent can the longevity and intensity of the recent Croatian 
economic crisis be attributed to uncertainty itself? That is the main research ques-
tion of this paper, and its basic contribution to the literature. 
This paper introduces an entire set of uncertainty indicators to the Croatian prac-
tice of economic research: political uncertainty, recession-related uncertainty 
(The Economist, 2002), fiscal uncertainty resulting from changes of fiscal legisla-
tion, uncertainty stemming from natural disasters and a Croatian version of the 
Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) economic policy uncertainty index. We also con-
sider indicators of prognostic disagreement (following Bachmann, Elstner and 
Sims, 2013) as proxy variables for economic uncertainty. Additionally, we employ 
the principle components method to generate a composite indicator of aggregate 
uncertainty as a linear combination of the previously stated variables. 
The second specificity of this paper is the interdisciplinary approach used to elu-
cidate the macroeconomic phenomenon of recession by utilizing the psychological 
concept of uncertainty (while controlling for other relevant micro- and macro-
economic predictors of economic activity). The third contribution to the literature 
is the analysis of the potentially time-varying influence of uncertainty on economic 
activity, for previous papers have found that uncertainty is counter-cyclical (in the 
sense of correlation; Bloom, 2014), but do not analyse whether the uncertainty 
effect is different in various phases of the economic cycle. This paper employs a 
VAR model with time-variable parameters (Primiceri, 2005; del Negro and Primi-
ceri, 2015) to test the hypothesis that economic activity is more responsive to 
uncertainty (in terms of the impulse response function) in a recession than in the 
expansionary phase of the economic cycle. 
The econometric analysis has shown that the observed uncertainty measures on 
average have a significant, but only temporary effect on economic activity. Such 
an inference regarding the negative short-run relationship between uncertainty 
and economic activity is quite robust to several alternative model specifications 
(structural VAR model with fixed parameters, the inclusion of foreign variables 
due to the fact that Croatia is a small open economy, and alternation of the control 
variables in the VAR model with time-varying parameters). Nevertheless, we 
show that the negative impact of most of the uncertainty measures employed 
becomes more pronounced in the contractionary phase of the cycle.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the main 
theoretical considerations of the relationship between uncertainty and economic 
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446 Section 3 deals with the data and methodological issues. Section 4 lays out the 
obtained econometric results, while the final section synthesizes the paper and 
sums up the main policy implications. 
2  tHeoRetIcal concePts of tHe InteRRelatIonsHIP betWeen 
UnceRtaIntY anD tHe Real econoMY 
The term uncertainty was introduced to the literature through a famous book by 
Frank Knight (1921), resulting in the concept nowadays often being referred to as 
Knightian uncertainty. The concept implies a situation in which economic agents 
are not able to anticipate future events or estimate the likelihood of their occur-
rence. Although uncertainty per se is a latent variable, the channels of its influence 
on economic activity are well elaborated in the literature. 
The most meticulous overview to date of theoretical frameworks describing the 
uncertainty-economic activity link is presented by Bloom (2014). Arčabić (2015) 
is a rare example of the genre among the domestic Croatian authors. The two 
stated authors emphasize two negative, but also two positive transmission chan-
nels of uncertainty. 
Bernanke (1983) introduces the first negative channel, and Bloom (2014) later on 
refers to it as the real options channel. Firms faced with uncertainty postpone their 
irreversible decisions in order to enrich their information set and reduce the uncer-
tainty related to making such decisions. Therefore, the wait and see mechanism 
(Bachmann and Bayer, 2013) is activated because activities such as investments, 
employment, and buying durable goods generate certain sunk costs. Consumers 
can also activate the exact same mechanisms in the sense of postponing the con-
sumption of durable goods or investing in financial assets. 
It should also be highlighted that there are four conditions under which the real 
options channel is efficient (Bloom, 2014:163-164): (i) the existence of consider-
able adjustment costs and irreversible decisions, (ii) the possibility of postponing 
decisions (partially or completely eliminated by perfect competition), (iii) firms 
operating in imperfectly competitive markets with decreasing returns to scale, and 
(iv) uncertainty should be variable (not constant). 
The second channel of influence is risk aversion. In a corporative sense, growth in 
uncertainty increases the risk premium and increases the cost of borrowing. It also 
discourages the company’s management from taking part in risky endeavours (espe-
cially if the management has shares in the company), and it ultimately decreases 
the aggregate investments and the overall economic activity. In the consumer 
sector, risk aversion is effectuated through precautionary savings, which again 
decreases personal consumption and consequently lowers GDP (Carroll, 1992). 
The two positive transmission channels are the growth options and the Oi-Hart-
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447to the fact that uncertainty can also be an incentive for risky investments in situa-
tions of high potential gain (e.g. the global economic growth due to the Internet 
revolution, the so-called dot-com boom in the second half of the 1990s). The 
Oi-Hartman-Abel effect is based on hedging against negative business results, or 
situations in which the potential gain from a positive outcome considerably sur-
passes the potential losses from bad business results. In such scenarios, firms often 
tend to be risk-seeking and to take part in new investments. 
The existing empirical findings offer far more evidence in favour of the negative 
influences of uncertainty (see Bloom (2014) for an excellent literature review), so 
it remains to be seen if the same will be corroborated for the Croatian economy. 
The latent character of uncertainty has conditioned the fact that it was empirically 
treated only descriptively until the global financial crisis in 2008. The prevailing 
turbulent economic conditions in 2008 triggered several methodological strands 
in the quantification of economic uncertainty. Their basic principles will be 
presented in the following subsections. 
2.1 baKeR blooM DaVIs InDeX of econoMIc PolIcY UnceRtaIntY
Prompted by the hypothesis that uncertainty is one of the major causes of such an 
atypically long and strong recession of the US economy after the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy, Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012) published their index of economic 
policy uncertainty (EPU index). The index is based on three pillars. The first is the 
archive of media news reports on economic uncertainty from 10 leading US news-
papers. Searching through that archive using specific keyword combinations (e.g. 
economic + uncertainty/uncertain + congress/deficit/legislation, etc.) enabled 
Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012) to publish a scaled measure of monthly frequen-
cies of articles dealing with economic uncertainty in the US. 
As the second pillar of their index, the authors establish the number of federal tax 
code provisions expiring in the following 10 years. 
The last EPU pillar is a disagreement measure based on the responses from the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). To be specific, the authors use disagree-
ment in forecasts of the consumer price index and the purchases of goods and 
services by the federal/state/local governments. The final estimate of EPU index 
is obtained each month by attaching a specific weight to each EPU component. A 
1/2 weight is attached to the media index of economic uncertainty, and a 1/6 is 
attached to the expiring tax code provisions, price level disagreement, and govern-
ment purchases.
The US public has mostly perceived the EPU index as a republican criticism of the 
Obama administration. However, it has also drawn the attention of researchers 
from various scientific fields. Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) published a revised 
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448 through higher stock price volatility on the US market. This effect (analysed 
through panel regressions) is shown to be particularly strong in companies closely 
tied to the government (defence sector, health care, and the construction sector).
The authors also use VAR modelling to show that the macro effects are very 
similar. Uncertainty reduces investments, employment levels in US companies, 
and US industrial production. The exposed conclusions are corroborated using 
various robustness checks and adding different control variables, and are also 
confirmed by a panel VAR model comprising 12 world economies that have had 
their own versions of the EPU index at the time. 
It is also worth mentioning Karnizova and Li (2014), who confirm the predictive 
characteristics of EPU in forecasting the US recessionary episodes; while Ajmi et 
al. (2015) point to the existence of (bi-directional) Granger causality between 
EPU and the US stock market yields. 
Considering the strong evidence of the significant influence of EPU index on the 
US economic activity, one of the goals of this paper is to quantify the Croatian 
version of a media-based uncertainty index, and scrutinize if it is characterized by 
the same effects as that for the USA. 
2.2 tHe econoMIst’s RecessIon InDeX
The Economist has conceptualized its R-word (recession) index as early as the 
beginning of the 2000s (The Economist, 2002). This indicator is based on the 
quarterly frequency of recession-related articles in the Washington Post and New 
York Times. The index witnessed its full affirmation in the scientific sense only 
with the onset of the global financial crisis, when it started to be calculated and 
published in other countries as well as the USA. For example, Grossarth-Maticek 
and Mayr (2008) point to the significance of the R-word index in dating the Ger-
man business cycle by a probit regression model. Iselin and Siliverstovs (2013) 
employ the autoregressive-distributed lag (ARDL) models of Swiss GDP, using 
the R-word index as the independent variable in the model. By doing so, they in-
crease the predictive accuracy of simple univariate benchmark models. Iselin and 
Siliverstovs (2016) provide very similar results for Switzerland, while the same 
models for the German economy show to be less precise. 
Considering the well-known fact that aggregate economic uncertainty is considera-
bly higher in recessions (in comparison to the stable growth periods) (Bloom, 2009; 
2014), the R-word index can also be viewed as a particular type of an uncertainty 
indicator. Since Croatia has not yet seen its own version of the R-word index, it will 
be interesting to quantify one and analyse its influence on the Croatian economic 
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4492.3 foRecastInG DIsaGReeMent as a PRoXY foR UnceRtaIntY
Bachmann, Elstner and Sims (2013) provide a follow-up on the third element of 
the EPU index, and postulate that uncertainty can be proxied by the degree of 
disagreement among economic forecasters. Their basic premise is that, in times of 
high uncertainty, the respondents in SPF would give remarkably heterogeneous 
answers to the questions focused on relevant variables from their economic sur-
roundings. However, a high level of response dispersion does not necessarily need 
to imply high uncertainty. That is the reason why some authors insist on a clear 
distinction between the terms disagreement and uncertainty in the classical Knigh-
tian sense (Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng, 2015; Krüger and Nolte, 2016). 
In the context of this paper, four separate indicators of disagreement are consid-
ered as proxy variables for economic uncertainty. All of them are based on the data 
from regular monthly Business and Consumer Surveys (BCS), published by the 
European Commission. The first indicator relates to consumers’ disagreements on 
future tendencies of the general economic situation in Croatia. The second and 
third indicators reflect the uncertainty of consumer expectations of future unem-
ployment and the timeliness of buying permanent goods. The fourth indicator is a 
disagreement measure stemming from all forward-looking questions in BCS. All 
four stated indicators will be explained in more detail in section 3.1.
Bachmann, Elstner and Sims (2013) use the described methodology to show that 
(ex ante) prognostic disagreement, just as the ex post prognostic errors of eco-
nomic agents, considerably reduce economic activity in the short run (measured 
by industrial production, working hours, and employment level). Their results for 
the US turn out to be more significant than those for the German economy. 
2.4 alteRnatIVe eMPIRIcal aPPRoacHes
Apart from the widely recognized uncertainty measures (which might be valid for 
any analysed economy), one should also take into account the specificities of post-
transition economies such as Croatia. Bloom (2014:162) emphasizes three spe-
cific uncertainty sources in economic systems of that type. First of all, they are 
often exposed to remarkable political instabilities and international conflicts. Due 
to their lower level of socio-economic development and insufficient infrastruc-
ture, they are also more prone to natural disasters such as floods or epidemics. The 
third group of relevant uncertainty drivers stems from the inefficient channels of 
fiscal and monetary policy. 
In the last two decades, Croatia has not witnessed a coup d’état or a war, but the 
Croatian form of crony capitalism has revealed the link between the state and eco-
nomic activity as a very important one. The elections play a particularly important 
role in generating political uncertainty (Mačkić, 2014) (especially with regards to 
the repeated parliamentary elections in September 2016 after only 10 months of the 
Orešković’ government). Other sources of political uncertainty include the prevail-
ing perception of public companies as the spoils of politics as well as an entire 
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450 Natural disasters also seem to be potentially relevant for the Croatian disasters, 
especially considering the dependency of agricultural production on the weather 
conditions, such as droughts and hailstorms, as well as floods, like those in Eastern 
Slavonia in May 2014. 
Considering the continuity of Croatian monetary policy in employing the kuna/
euro exchange rate as the nominal anchor for maintaining price stability, we pos-
tulate that monetary uncertainty (if there is any at all) is not relevant in Croatia, 
and will not be examined here.1 On the other hand, fiscal uncertainty in Croatia is 
a problem that was recognized a long time ago (Bejaković, 2009). 
The three stated uncertainty sources (political instability, natural disasters and 
fiscal instability) will be scrutinized in the following sections, along with their 
corresponding quantitative uncertainty indicators. 
3 Data anD MetHoDoloGY
This section presents a brief overview of the analysed uncertainty indicators (as 
well as the other examined macroeconomic variables). The methodological basis 
of the utilized structural VAR models (with fixed and time-varying parameters) is 
presented afterwards.
3.1 Data
The main methodological innovation of this paper is the introduction of several 
uncertainty indicators that have so far not been considered for the Croatian econ-
omy. To be specific, four monthly media-based indicators are formed: Baker 
Bloom Davis index (BBD)2, political uncertainty index (polit), the R-word index 
(R_index), and an indicator of uncertainty related to natural disasters (nature). 
With the goal of quantifying the named indicators, we formed a database of media 
articles from the Internet archives of the most read Croatian news portals: Jutar-
nji list, Večernji list, 24sata, index.hr, dnevnik.hr, and Poslovni dnevnik. Besides 
the fact that these are the most popular Croatian daily newspapers, their web 
portals are regularly among the most visited of all Croatian web sites (Gemius 
Audience, 2017). Further on, these are (to the best of the authors’ knowledge), the 
only news portals to have a coherent article archive without the breaks constituted 
by methodological changes. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the 
described database will serve its purpose as the foundation for quantifying media-
based economic uncertainty in Croatia. The database comprises articles dating 
from November 2002 to December 2016, but each of the six examined web por-
tals has its own starting date. Finally, the database comprises 1,030,768 articles for 
1 The readers may consult Governor Vujčić’s frequent public presentations (e.g. Vujčić, 2016a; b) as indica-
tions of the strict focus on the stability of the HRK/EUR exchange rate. 
2 The Croatian version of the BBD index, as suggested in this paper, is founded solely on the media reports 
on uncertainty. The uncertainty stemming from tax changes will be evaluated separately, just as the influence 
of forecasting disagreement (quantified through equation 1) on economic activity, will be treated separately. 
Therefore, a separate label is introduced for the Baker Bloom Davis index (BBD), different from the US EPU 
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451the observed period, out of which 10,491 are employed for the calculation of EPU 
index, 225,691 are used for the political uncertainty index, 36,810 for the natural 
disasters index, and 77,843 for the R-word index. 
Using Structured Query Language (SQL), we search the database by pre-formu-
lated combinations of keywords, different for each uncertainty indicator. A de-
tailed list of keywords is given in appendix 1. For example, an article enters the 
quantification of BBD index if it contains at least one of the keywords in part (a) 
of appendix 1 (e.g. economy, economic, etc.), at the same time at least one of the 
words in column “Logical conjunction I” (e.g. minister, prime minister), and some 
of the words from column “Logical conjunction II” (e.g. uncertainty, uncertain, 
etc.). The same logic (with the complete list of keywords given in appendix 1) is 
also applied for the polit3, R_index and nature indicators. After separating the 
articles that satisfy the stated criteria, we formed the monthly relative frequencies 
(number of extracted articles divided by the number of total articles). The ob-
tained results for each individual web portal are then standardized (in accordance 
with Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) and Girardi and Reuter (2016) and averaged 
by months. 
The fifth analysed uncertainty indicator refers to changes in fiscal legislation. To 
quantify it, we again use SQL to filter the legal acts from the web repository of law 
amendments (Narodne novine). The keywords utilized for this purpose are also 
given in appendix 1. From the total set of law acts containing the term “tax” in their 
title, we exclude those acts concerning the appointment or dismissal of officials in 
the Government or the Tax Administration, as well as specific changes in the tax 
rulebooks valid at the municipality/city/county level. Out of the total 49,749 legal 
acts, we extracted 298 “true” tax changes. In this specific case, we did not form the 
uncertainty indicator out of the obtained monthly frequencies of tax changes since 
a considerable number of months did not see any law changes at all (satisfying the 
adopted criteria). The intensity of the influence of a particular law change (in the 
sense of (un)certainty) is the strongest immediately before and after its passing and 
publication in Narodne novine. To account for that, we form a 6-months cumula-
tive (3 months before and 3 months after the passing of a law) of the number of tax 
changes (PI 6), and the econometric analysis is continued with that indicator.4
The basic five indicators analysed in this paper are presented in graphs 1-5. The 
BBD index shows a below average level of uncertainty right until the onset of the 
2008 crisis, followed by an obvious, considerable and long lasting increase of 
uncertainty in the economic system. 
3 It should be noted that the list of keywords for the polit indicator does not comprise the terms “country 
prefect”, “mayor”, etc. The authors’ intention was to extract only those political shocks that might significantly 
influence the Croatian macroeconomic tendencies. Following that approach, our analysis did not include (inter 
alia) the corruption scandals related to local potentates like the mayors Vlahović (Dubrovnik), Sabo (Vukovar) 
or Bandić (Zagreb), and the local prefect Lovrić Merzel (Sisačko-Moslavačka County).
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452 Graph 1 

























Note: Dotted lines point to the dates of parliamentary elections, while full lines point to presi-
dential elections.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Graph 2 vividly shows that the local maxima of political uncertainty correspond 
to the pre-election campaigns (related to parliamentary or presidential elections). 
Therefore, political uncertainty cycles mostly coincide with the electoral cycles. 
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453former prime-minister Ivo Sanader in July 2009 and the reconstruction of 
Milanović’s government (Slavko Linić lay off in May 2014 and the changes of 
ministers Jovanović-Mornar and Ostojić-Varga one month later). 
Graph 3 















The R-word index graphically looks very similar to the BBD index, presenting a 
cyclical match between economic activity and uncertainty.
Graph 4 
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454 The indicator of natural disaster-related uncertainty is characterized by a remark-
able low-level stability. Practically one single shock is recorded, corresponding to 
the floods in Eastern Slavonia in May 2014. 
Graph 5 


















Graph 5 identifies four extreme increases of fiscal uncertainty. The first one oc-
curred in late 2002, when a series of special tax (on tobacco products, personal 
vehicles, oil derivates, non-alcoholic beverages, luxury products, etc.) laws was 
passed. The other one refers to the introduction of the “crisis tax” and the increase 
of the VAT tax rate from 22% to 23%. The third and the most intensive uncer-
tainty shock happened in 2013 when, apart from the harmonisation of domestic 
fiscal legislation with EU regulations, a series of VAT, income tax and profit tax 
changes was also passed. The fourth episode corresponds to the package of law 
changes of the then finance minister Lalovac in January 2015 (law and rulebook 
changes related to VAT, income tax, lottery taxation, real estate transfer tax and 
consumption tax).  
Besides the stated five media-based uncertainty indicators, we also analyse four 
measures of disagreement. The first one is calculated from the proportions of 
responses to BCS question 4 (European Commission, 2014):
How do you expect the general economic situation in this country to develop over 
the next 12 months? It will: a) get a lot better, b) get a little better, c) stay the same, 
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455Based on the methodology of Bachmann, Elstner and Sims (2013), a disagreement 
indicator (dis_4) is calculated as a standard deviation of (positive and negative) 
response shares of question 4: 
 , (1)
where fract
+ is the share of positive answers (a + b), and fract– is the share of 
negative answers (d + e).5 In the next step, dis_4 is standardized, and finally scaled 
to have an expected value of 100 and a standard deviation of 10 (for easier inter-
pretation). 
Following the exact same methodology, we also calculate the disagreement stem-
ming from questions on future unemployment rate (Q7, indicator dis_7) and the 
assessments of appropriate time for major purchases (Q8, indicator dis_8).
In line with the methodology of Girardi and Reuter (2016), we additionally con-
sider a combination of all forward-looking questions from the BCS. That is a total 
of 18 questions (17 questions just as in the online appendix of Girardi and Reuter 
(2016)6, plus question 11 from the Consumer Survey, focusing on the likelihood 
of saving any money in the household).7 In calculating this aggregate disagree-
ment measure (dis_agr), all 18 individual standard deviations of responses (rela-
tion 1) are standardized, then averaged and finally scaled for easier interpretation. 
That way, an aggregate indicator of forecasting disagreement is obtained, cover-
ing five different business sectors: manufacturing industry, construction, services, 
retail trade and the consumer sector. The results of all analysed disagreement 
measures are presented in graph 6. Respecting the fact that dis_agr is available 
only from May 2008, very similar tendencies are noticed in dis_4, dis_7, and 
dis_agr. The disagreement of economic agents is the highest during the crisis 
onset, followed by a continuous and long-term decline. On the other hand, dis_8 
exhibits a somewhat longer-lasting growth after the outbreak of the crisis. This 
shows that the consumers did not considerably revise their uncertainty assess-
ments as related to major purchases, even until the end of 2016.
That way we obtain a total of 10 individual uncertainty indicators. Besides them, 
we also utilize the following macroeconomic variables in VAR modelling: 
3-month money market interest rate (int), real average wage index (rwage), HICP 
index (HICP), and the industrial production index (ind).8 Considering the fact 
that Croatia is a small open economy, we also utilize the following control varia-
bles: STOXX  600 stock index (STOXX 600), oil prices (oil), euro area industrial 
5 Answers “don’t know” are excluded from further consideration.
6 Girardi and Reuter (2016) obtain rather standard results in comparison to the related literature. All the 
observed disagreement measures have a negative and strictly short-run effect on the euro area GDP.
7 For the exact wording of all BCS questions, see European Commission (2014). 
8 The industrial production index is analysed as a proxy for GDP to increase the data frequency and ensure an 
adequate sample size. The same procedure is also used in similar studies: Bloom (2009), Bachmann, Elstner 
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456 pro duction (ind*), and the 3-month euro area money market interest rate (int*). 
All analysed variables are seasonally adjusted using the ARIMA X12 method. A 
description of individual variables, together with data sources and the available 
data spans, are given in appendix 2.
Graph 6 
Disagreement measures
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Source: Authors’ calculations.
3.2  MetHoDoloGIcal GRoUnDs
The influence of economic uncertainty on the Croatian economy will be tested 
using two classes of econometric models. The first step entails a customary VAR 
model with time-fixed parameters, while the second step includes a more complex 
VAR model with time-varying parameters (Primiceri, 2015; and del Negro and 
Primiceri, 2015).
In the literature it is common to analyse the interrelationship between uncertainty 
and economic activity using VAR models (Bloom, 2009; Bachmann, Elstner and 
Sims, 2013; Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng, 2015; Girardi and Reuter, 2016). The 
same methodological principle is also the foundation of this paper. Its starting 
point is the estimation of a structural VAR model in the vein of Blanchard and 
Quah (1989), while the analysed dataset and their ordering in the innovation anal-
ysis is mostly taken from the above studies. Therefore, the starting VAR model 
comprises the following variables (in the exact order): unc (uncertainty indicator), 
int, rwage, HICP, and ind. Complying with the mentioned papers (Bloom, 2009; 
Bachmann, Elstner and Sims, 2013; Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng, 2015; Girardi and 
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457We estimated ten different versions of the initial VAR model. In each of them unc 
is represented by a different uncertainty indicator: five media-based, four disagree-
ment measures, and finally a composite uncertainty indicator (score), obtained by 
principal component analysis from the five media-based measures.9 Its basic prin-
ciple is that each uncertainty type (the media, recession, tax changes, politics, and 
natural disasters) affects economic activity in some (not necessarily the same) 
way. Here we present an effort to aggregate the stated sorts of uncertainty to a 
macro level, and analyse its impact on the economic activity. 
The next step of the analysis is to estimate the following structural VAR model:
 , (2)
where  is 
a vector of system variables, Ai are matrices of structural parameters, and εt is a 
vector of i.i.d. normally distributed (structural) error terms.10 
Since previous studies of economic uncertainty (Bloom, 2009; Bachmann, Elstner 
and Sims, 2013; Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng, 2015; Girardi and Reuter, 2016) deal 
with developed western economies like the USA, the euro zone or Germany, it 
comes as no surprise that their VAR models are restricted solely to a set of domes-
tic variables. Considering the fact that Croatia is a small open economy, we aug-
ment the initial VAR model by three separate foreign variables: STOXX 600, oil, 
ind*, and int*. Taking these into account, the vector of system variables can be 
disaggregated into two distinct blocks:
 , (3)
where Y1,t is the foreign, and Y2,t  is the domestic block of variables. To be spe-
cific, the stated blocks are given as  and 
. 
Further on, the matrices of structural parameters Ai (quantifying the interrelation-
ships among the system variables up to period p) can be presented as follows:
  (4)
9 score is obtained as the first principal component of the five analysed variables (the obtained eigenvalues is 
equal to 2.1645). The corresponding weights (loadings) are: 0.61 for BBD, 0.22 for nature, 0.32 for PI6, 0.28 
for polit and 0.63 for R_index. It can therefore be concluded that the lion’s share of aggregate uncertainty can 
be attributed to media reports (BBD) and recession (R_index). They are followed by tax changes and political 
instability, while the natural disasters have the weakest influence. The proportion of the total variance explained 
by the first component is 0.4329. It should be noted that Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) apply a similar strategy 
of aggregating different types of uncertainty, but they apply arbitrarily chosen weights.
10 It is important to notice that the constant term is not included in equation (2) for simplicity. However, it has 
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458 The assumption that external shocks influence the domestic economy (and not 
vice versa) effectuates in the block exogeneity restriction Ai12 = 0.
Let A0 be the matrix of parameters quantifying contemporaneous interrelationships 
among system variables. Then, the reduced-form VAR model can be obtained by 
multiplying equation (2) by matrix A0
-1:
  , (5)
where B1, B2, ..., Bp are parameter matrices of the reduced-form VAR model, and 
ut is a vector of i.i.d. error terms. Lütkepohl (2005) shows that matrices Bi  keep 
the block exogeneity restriction:
  (6)
To identify the structural shocks εt = A0 ut , it is necessary to introduce additional 
restrictions. 
Considering the fact that in all 9∙8/2=36 restrictions are needed for the ana- 
 lysed system of 9 variables, Cholesky decomposition is employed. Since A0 is 
a lower triangular matrix, this enables the exact identification of the system. The 
variable ordering in Cholesky decomposition is given as follows: 
. 
The set of analysed variables is mostly taken from similar international studies 
(Bloom, 2009; Bachmann, Elstner and Sims, 2013; Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng, 
2015; Girardi and Reuter, 2016). It should be noted that two of the thereby exam-
ined variables (working hours and employment level) that are utilized by Jurado, 
Ludvigson and Ng (2015), and Girardi and Reuter (2016) are not recorded in 
Croatia at all, or the series at hand is too short. 
As the last relevant remark regarding the structural VAR model, it should be noted 
that all analysed variables are examined in levels; despite the fact the ADF test 
results indicate nonstationarity.11 The first reason is that structural VAR models 
tolerate nonstationarity (Lütkepohl and Krätzig, 2004), and the other one is that 
the exact same procedure was also followed by the authors of similar studies 
(Bloom, 2009; Bachmann, Elstner and Sims, 2013; Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng, 
2015; Girardi and Reuter, 2016). 
In the next step of the analysis, we estimate a structural VAR model with time-
varying parameters and a time-varying covariance matrix of residuals (Primiceri, 
2005; del Negro and Primiceri, 2015). The main motivation for the utilization of 
this model is the questioning of the hypothesis that uncertainty has a different 
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459effect on economic activity in different phases of the economic/political cycles. 
We start from the following reduced-form VAR model:
  , (7)
where Yt is a n ×1 vector of endogenous variables, bt is a vector of time-varying 
intercepts, B
i,t 
(i = 1, ..., k) are the n × n matrices of time-varying parameters, and ut 
is a n ×1 vector of heteroscedastic shocks with a time-varying covariance matrix 
Ωt . The stated model can be reformulated into a structural VAR specification of 




where At is a lower-triangular matrix of the following form:
  
It is essential to notice that matrix At is time-varying, implying that a shock in a 
certain variable has a time-varying effect on all other variables in the system. 
Primiceri (2005:823) emphasizes that this kind of specification has two key 
advantages in comparison to structural break models. The first one is that a model 
including forward-looking variables (like uncertainty in this paper) favours con-
tinuous and smooth changes of model parameters. Additionally, any kind of a 
learning process adopted by the consumers, firms or policymakers implies con-
tinuous (not discrete) parameter shifts. 
Further on, Σt is a diagonal matrix of the following type:
  
Time-variability of standard deviations of shocks in Σt implies multivariate stochas-
tic volatility, included in the model to account for potentially heteroskedastic shocks 
and potential nonlinearities in the variable relationships (Primiceri, 2005:823). 
Time-varying parameters from matrices At and Bt are modelled as random walk 
processes, and the standard deviations σt are modelled as a geometric random 
walk process.
 Bt = Bt–1 + vt (9)
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460  log σt = log σt–1 + ηt (11)
It is also assumed that all error terms (εt, vt, ζt and ηt ) are jointly normally distrib-
uted, and their covariance matrix has the following form:
  , (12)
where In is a n-dimensional identity matrix, while Q, S and W are positive definite 
matrices. S is a block-diagonal matrix, with blocks corresponding to the rows of 
matrix At. 
Having in mind that the system of equations (8-12) has an extremely large number 
of parameters, a Bayesian approach would considerably facilitate its estimation. 
In accordance with the pioneer of this sort of a time-varying VAR model (Primiceri, 
2005), we also estimate equation (8) by OLS on the starting 40 observations (2002 
M11 – 2006 M02) to calibrate the prior distributions of system parameters. The 
estimates of parameters from Bˆ
OLS
 are obtained by estimating individual equations 




 are obtained through a 
Cholesky factorization of the covariance matrix Ωt  of residuals from the reduced 











are also obtained by the standard OLS method. Further on, in accordance with 
Primiceri (2005), and Cogley and Sargent (2005), the prior distribution of time-
varying parameters is taken to be normal, while the prior distribution of hyper-
parameters from matrices Q, W, and those from the diagonal blocks of matrix 
S (S1 and S2), is the inverse Wishart (IW) distribution. Relations (13-19) give the 
formalization of prior distributions of the utilized Bayesian approach. 
 B0 ~ N (BˆOLS, 4 ∙ V(BˆOLS)), (13)
 A0 ~ N (ÂOLS, 4 ∙ V(ÂOLS)), (14)
 log σ0 ~ N (log σˆOLS, In), (15)
 Q ~ IW (kQ2  ∙ 40 ∙ V(βˆOLS), 40), (16)
 W ~ IW (kW2  ∙ 4 ∙ In, 4), (17)
 S1 ~ IW (kS2 ∙ 2 ∙ V(Â1,OLS), 2), (18)
 S2 ~ IW (kS2  ∙ 3 ∙ V(Â2,OLS), 3), (19)
where the covariance matrix from equations (13-14) is up to a scalar equal to the 
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461parameter of the inverse Wishart distribution) for relations (16, 18, 19) is also up to 
a scalar equal to the covariance matrix obtained by OLS. The parameter values 
kQ = kW = 0.01, and kS = 0.1 are taken from Primiceri (2005). The degrees of free-
dom of IW distributions (equations 16-19) are equal to 40, 4, 2 and 3 (respectively).
Starting from the stated prior distributions, del Negro and Primiceri (2015) intro-
duce a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for estimating the poste-
rior distributions of the model parameters (BT, AT, ΣT and the hyperparameters 
from matrix V). To be concrete, we apply a specific form of the Gibbs sampler 
(named “algorithm 3” by del Negro and Primiceri, 2015:1343) on the remaining 
part of data after the initial 40 observations (2006 M03 – 2016 M12). The empiri-
cal results (shown in section 4) are obtained through 10 000 MCMC draws from 
the posterior distributions of the model parameters. 
4 eMPIRIcal ResUlts
Prior to concrete econometric analysis of the observed time series, we first present 
their correlation matrix (table 1).
The issue of special interest here is the correlation between all the suggested un-
certainty measures, as well as the correlation between each individual uncertainty 
indicator and economic activity. A glance at the last row of table 1 reveals that six 
out of ten suggested indicators are negatively (and mostly significantly) correlated 
to the domestic industrial production, as well as to real wages and CROBEX. 
These inferences are almost entirely in line with the stylized fact of uncertainty 
being a countercyclical variable (Bloom, 2014). There are only two uncertainty 
measures that deviate from this conclusion (dis_4 and dis_agr). These two varia-
bles are because of that not shown in table 1 to save space, and are not examined 
in further econometric analysis.12
In the following steps, two (time-fixed) structural VAR models are estimated: the 
initial, reduced-form one (including only domestic variables) and the augmented 
one (comprising also the foreign variables). Each of the two models is estimated 
in eight different specifications, i.e. each of them includes a different uncertainty 
indicator.13 The lag order in each model is chosen by the Schwarz information 
criterion.14 In their final versions, all eight models are estimated with three lags. 
The forecasting error variance decomposition of ind in the augmented model (for 
the forecasting horizon of 24 months) is presented in table 2. 
12 We also tried to quantify uncertainty through a GARCH estimation of conditional variance of the industrial 
production index (in line with e.g. Fountas et al., 2006), but that variable was negligibly positively correlated 
to economic activity. The same conclusion is also drawn for Google trends data (frequency of Web searches 
by the terms “economic crisis” and “recession”) for Croatia. Therefore, all of these alternatives are, just as 
dis_4 and dis_agr, excluded from further analysis. 
13 The results of the initial and augmented model (impulse response functions and forecasting error variance 
decompositions) are qualitatively very similar. To save space, only the augmented model results are shown here. 
14 In cases when the chosen lag order was not sufficient to eliminate autocorrelation from the model, addi-
tional lags were successively added to the model up to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis of a Lagrange 
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463Table 2 




STOXX 600 oil ind* int* unc int rwage HICP ind
BBD 0.25 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.36
polit 0.24 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.37
PI 6 0.26 0.16 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.34
R_index 0.23 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.34
nature 0.25 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.36
score 0.25 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.36
dis_7 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.33
dis_8 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.34
Source: Authors’ calculations.
It is shown that the lion’s share of the variability of Croatian economic activity can 
individually be attributed (except the ind variable itself) to the STOXX 600 index 
and oil prices on the world market. This inference is in line with the results of 
Krznar and Kunovac (2010), which show that foreign variables explain approxi-
mately 50% of Croatian GDP variability. Further on, it is interesting that 
STOXX 600 maintains a considerably high variance share in all eight augmented 
models. This can also, in a wider sense, be linked to the overall importance of the 
financial sector for the Croatian economic activity (Dumičić and Krznar, 2013). 
Additionally, it seems that it is reasonable to postulate that energy prices are the 
main determinant of economic activity (Croatian National Bank, 2015).
Finally, we show that uncertainty does not explain a particularly large proportion 
of industrial production variability. R_index and polit are shown to be the “relative 
winners” with the share of 4%, while the other indicators have smaller or even 
trivial effects on economic activity. Besides the forecasting error variance decom-
position, it is also important to examine the impulse response functions (IRFs) to 
gain an insight into the dynamic interdependence of the analysed variables. Graph 
7 gives the estimated IRFs of industrial production in response to a shock in 
uncertainty.15
Depicting the 68% confidence interval on graph 6 (in line with similar studies: 
Bloom, 2009; Primiceri, 2005; del Negro and Primiceri, 2015; Jurado, Ludvigson 
and Ng, 2015; Belongia and Ireland, 2016) enables indirect conclusions about the 
statistical significance of IRFs (depending on the confidence interval including 
zero or not). Most IRFs from graph 7 are rather similar (with the exception of polit) 
and reveal a significant short-run uncertainty effect. Nevertheless, the duration of 
the effect is extremely short, and it fades away after only a few months. The impact 
of political uncertainty appears to be relevant only in the medium-term. Economic 
activity does not seem to respond to political turmoil in the short run. 
15 We suppress the IRFs resulting from shocks in variables BBD and nature, since these were not shown to be 
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464 Graph 7
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Note: Time on the x-axis is measured in months. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
The estimated IRFs are of rather similar intensity. A one standard deviation shock 
in the variables BBD, PI 6, R_index, score, and dis_8 has the strongest effect in the 
initial period or in the first month after the shock. The stated influence corresponds 
to a reduction of economic activity by 0.45%, 0.3%, 0.66%, 0.47%, and 0.57% 
(respectively). For instance, the standard deviation of residuals from the VAR 
equation with PI 6 as the dependent variable is equal to 1.84. Considering that ind 
is in logs, this result implies that each additional change of fiscal legislation in a 6 
month period causes a decrease of industrial production by 0.16% (conditional on 
all other variables in the system). 
It should be noted that Bloom (2009) applies a similar analysis for the USA, detect-
ing an abrupt short-run activity reduction as a response to an uncertainty shock. 
Such a downturn is followed by a recovery, ending with an overshooting effect. In 
the case of the analysis presented here, the IRFs are characterized by rather similar 
effects. As the end of the 24th month horizon comes near, the uncertainty effects 
even cross over to the positive domain. An obvious exception is again polit, whose 
negative effect is apparent only in the medium run.
The following empirical step is the estimation of a time-varying VAR model (del 
Negro and Primiceri, 2015). Having in mind that the analysed model includes a 
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466 tions 8-12), empirical application of this model regularly include three variables 
at most (Primiceri, 2005; del Negro and Primiceri, 2015; Belongia and Ireland, 
2016). Since it was not possible to examine the widest possible model specifica-
tion, we estimated several trivariate models. Each of them comprises a single 
uncertainty indicator and the industrial production index. The third, alternating 
position is held by one of the variables with the highest ind variance decomposi-
tion share in the structural VAR with time-fixed parameters. Variables STOXX 600, 
unc and ind (in this exact Cholesky ordering) are considered for the first time-
varying parameters VAR. Namely, those are the variables with the highest indi-
vidual share in the forecasting error variance of ind: 21.63%, 1.88%, and 35.00% 
(respectively, averaged by rows of table 2, i.e. by uncertainty indicators), sum-
ming up to a respectable 58.5%.16 
Graph 8 shows the time-varying IRFs of industrial production to a shock in six 
analysed uncertainty indicators. The date points for which the IRFs are calculated 
are conceptually similar to those of Primiceri (2005). Namely, Primiceri performs 
a comparable VAR analysis for the US business cycle turning points. A similar 
principle is also applied here, so the targeted date points are: 2008 M06 (peak of 
the cycle, followed by a drastic fall of economic activity), 2010 M04 (start of the 
economic recovery programme by the government of Jadranka Kosor), 2014 M12 
(end of the recession), and 2016 M09 (the highest value of the industrial produc-
tion index in the post-crisis period). The identified date points are analysed for the 
indicators BBD, PI 6, R_index, and score. For the nature variable, 2010 M04 is 
modified to 2014 M05 to account for the Eastern Slavonia floods at that time. For 
the polit indicator, the time points are determined by the dates of parliamentary 
elections (2007 M11, 2011 M12, 2015 M11, and 2016 M09), and by the middle 
points of electoral cycles as representatives of politically “calmer” times (2009 
M11 and 2013 M11).17 The first conclusion obtained from graph 8 is that most of 
the analysed uncertainty measures exhibit a time-varying effect on economic 
activity. This is particularly pronounced for variables BBD, PI 6, R_index, and 
score, while the influence of political turmoil and natural disasters is relatively 
constant throughout the entire analysed period. The basic principle of the detected 
time-variability is that the uncertainty effect is the strongest at the very onset of 
the crisis (2008 M06), and it gradually fades away with time. It is the weakest in 
the last analysed time point (2016 M09), when it practically converges to zero. 
The only exception from the observed pattern is PI 6. Fiscal instability has a “less 
negative“ short-run effect at the crisis epicentre, while the intensity of the stated 
negative influence increases as the economy heats.
16 Alternatively, STOXX 600 was replaced by oil (with the average share in the forecast error variance of 
industrial production equal to 16.38%). The results obtained that way showed to be qualitatively very similar.
17 For each of the stated indicators, somewhat different date points are considered, but the basic conclusions 
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467Graph 8 
Comparison of time-varying IRFs of industrial production (shock in economic 
uncertainty) 
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Note: Time on the x-axis is measured in months. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
In the context of policymaking, a question arises as to whether the introduction of 
large and frequent fiscal changes in the system is justifiable. Considering that PI 6 
has the weakest effect in the crisis, this partially exculpates fiscal expansion as a 
counter-recession measure. It should be highlighted, of course, that the negative 
effect of fiscal instability noticed here is of a merely short-run nature.
Graphs 9-11 present very similar information. Except from the sole IRFs (poste-
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468 with similar reports (Bloom, 2009; Primiceri, 2005; del Negro and Primiceri, 
2015; Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng, 2015; Belongia and Ireland, 2016). That way we 
obtain the middle 68% of the posterior distribution, which comes down to the 
interval of ±1 standard error in the normal distribution case.18 A short overview of 
graphs 9-11 reveals that the effects of shocks in all three uncertainty indicators are 
depicted by J-curves. The function shapes are somewhat different from those in 
graph 7, and their maximum values (in absolute terms) are somewhat smaller. 
However, all the main conclusions remain intact: the short-run uncertainty effect 
is significant, negative, and quickly diminishing. The IRFs estimated at the very 
start of the crisis are quite persistent, but with the heating of the economy (as 2016 
M09 becomes closer), they get closer to zero.19 
Graph 9 
Time-varying IRFs of industrial production (shock in R_index) 
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Note: Time on the x-axis is measured in months. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
18 IRFs for BBD, polit, and nature are left out because they were not statistically significant. 
19 As a robustness check, we also attempted to redo the analysis with quarterly data for the Croatian economy 
(comprising GDP as the dependent variable and quarterly versions of other variables, obtained as averages 
of the corresponding monthly observations). However, due to there being too few data points and to the 
complexity of the assumed relationships between the observed variables, the utilized numerical methods used 
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469Graph 10 
Time-varying IRFs of industrial production (shock in PI 6) 
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Note: Time on the x-axis is measured in months. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Graph 11 
Time-varying IRFs of industrial production (shock in score) 
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470 5 DIscUssIon anD conclUsIon
This paper offers an explanation of the intensity and persistence of the recent 
crisis by introducing the psychological concept of uncertainty in macroeconomic 
analysis. With that goal, we quantified and analysed eight different uncertainty 
indicators by utilizing a web database of articles from the most popular Croatian 
news portals, the Narodne novine repository of legal amendments, and BCS. Out 
of the considered uncertainty types, the following media based indicators seem to 
be especially relevant: the R-word index, fiscal legislation uncertainty, and the 
composite uncertainty indicator obtained by principal component analysis of indi-
vidual uncertainty measures. 
The overall conclusion is, in short, that the uncertainty effect is statistically sig-
nificant, but short-lived and rather weak. The results of the VAR model with time-
varying parameters are especially relevant; confirming that the uncertainty effect 
(quantified through the R-word index and the composite uncertainty indicator) 
changes throughout the phases of the business cycle. Its negative influence is the 
strongest at the very epicentre of the crisis in mid-2008, and it gradually disap-
pears as the economy starts to heat again. These results can be put in relation to 
the long since observed phenomenon that consumer confidence significantly 
affects consumption expenditures only upon abrupt and unexpected downturns of 
economic activity (Garner, 1991). Although confidence (first moment, expected 
value) is a concept inherently different from uncertainty (second moment, distri-
bution variance), sudden falls of economic activity obviously activate the same 
mechanisms (wait and see, risk aversion) in economic agents. 
The implications of these results for policymakers primarily refer to the impor-
tance of adequate crisis communication, but also the general informing of all 
involved parties about the planned measures of fiscal, monetary, or any other type 
of economic policy. Recession for sure cannot be avoided by mere timely com-
munication of the economic policy measures to the public (consumers, firms, 
banks), but the effects of a crisis can probably be held under control to a certain 
extent. The necessity of sound communication of the planned policy moves was 
recognized as a conditio sine qua non of efficient economic policy a long time ago 
(Kramer et al., 2008). On the other hand, recent domestic trends such as the then 
government’s refusal to face the evident crisis in November 2008 (Jutarnji list, 
2015) give an example of the negative effect of uncertainty due to inadequate 
communication. 
A special comment should also be devoted to the performance of the fiscal uncer-
tainty indicator, especially with regards to the current implementation of the tax 
reform in Croatia. To avoid the obviously existing negative short-run effects 
caused by the large number of fiscal changes, it is vital to present a clear and 
coherent workflow of tax reform activities in the 4-year period. In addition, with-
out going into any normative issues of equity and wealth distribution, if lowering 
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471activities should keep the same direction (independent of the current economic and 
political circumstances). That would diminish fiscal instability, which is recognized 
as a source of confusion and as an obstacle to entrepreneurship and the attraction 
of FDI even by tax reform working group members (Zrinušić and Vuraić Kudeljan, 
2016:31). This premise is also in line with the fourth Bloom (2014:164) condition 
for the efficiency of the real options channel: uncertainty has a negative effect on 
the economy (investments, entrepreneurial activities, consumption) only when it is 
variable (volatile). In situations of permanent uncertainty, economic agents adapt 
to it. Following the same logic, they will be capable of adjusting their business 
plans to the coordinated legislation changes in the direction of tax disburdening. 
Similar conclusions should also be drawn for the possible future implementation 
of a macro-reform of revoking various administrative barriers to business 
(Čučković and Bartlett, 2007) and the cancelling a part of the enormous number 
of para-fiscal charges that block the development of small and medium entrepre-
neurship. Impinging on the existing system of business-related legal, administra-
tive, and fiscal regulations would surely generate a certain level of economic 
uncertainty, but that is by no means a reason to walk-away from reform in the 
segment of business facilitating. On the contrary, that segment should also be 
operationalised taking into account the necessity of adequate communication to 
the interested parties, and by insisting on keeping the long-run course of deregu-
lating business conduction. 
This paper presents one of the initial steps needed to elucidate the phenomenon of 
uncertainty and its influence on macro and micro tendencies. We see a sectoral 
analysis in the vein of Arčabić (2015) as a potentially fruitful direction for future 
research, where the savings and borrowing of consumers, companies, and the state 
would be scrutinized separately. It remains to be seen if the measures of prognos-
tic disagreement (quantified from BCS as the central source of data on psycho-
logical concepts in economics) become significant predictors of economic activity, 
once the number of data points at hand gets larger.
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474 aPPenDIX 2 
Table a6
Dataset description
Variable Description time span source
int 3-month money market 
interest rate (ZIBOR)
2002 M11 – 2016 M12
Eurostat
rwage
Real net wage; 2010=100; 
deflated by the Harmonized 
Index of Consumer Prices 
Eurostat
HICP
2010=100; all categories  
of goods included Eurostat
ind




Stock index of 600 



















PI 6, nature 
and polit




2005 M05 – 2016 M12
European 
Commission
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